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I. Sweeping Transformation
The twentieth century was a time of gn~atchange for tort law@in
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(I) See Vincent R. Johnson and Alan Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 3 (2d ed
1999):
In general, tort law is a vehicle of legal redress for victims of physical injury or damage
to tangible property. It also, on occasion, provides compensation or other relief for such di-
verse forms of harm as mental distress, impairment of reputation, and non-tangible econotu-
ic injuries.
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America. At the beginning of the 1900s, victims of physical injury
and property damage were afforded little in the way of redress. ~
Under a variety of legal doctrines-some of which were almost stun—
ning in their severity~-tortplaintiffs were routinely denied recov-
(4E~~iQ)activities... . [F] very person whose conduct or inaction precipitates a re-
stilt which atiother perceives as harmful is a potential tort defendant.
lort law encompasses many distinct cause.s of action-including, for example, claims for
defamation, invasion of privacy, negligence, and false imprisonment, to mention but a few.
Sonic torts (such as trespass to land) are ancient in origin, while others (such as strict prod-
ucts liability) have emerged only recently; a number of actions (for example, deceit) at-c
well-defined and consistently recognized, though others (for example, wrongful birth and
wrongful life) are only loosely undersoxxl or are the subject of little consensus.
New torts are constantly being elevated to legal status as ideas change concerning the
duties pet~onsowe to one another
(I) Twentiet Ii century changes in tort ductrine were accompanied by-perhaps caused
by-changes in views atx)ut injury compensation. SeeG. Edward White, Tort Law in Amen—
ca xv. (I 980) (“1’he attitudes of educated Americans toward injuries have changed dramati-
cally over the past hundred years. A widespread attitude which associated injury with bad
luck or deficiencies in character has gradually been replaced by one which presumes that most
injured per~ains are entitled to conipensat ion, through the legal system or some other mecha-
nisnu” )
© For example, at the beginning of the century, the no-duty-to-rescue rule was so
firmly implanted in American tort jurisprudenee that the Supreme court of Kansas could
bluntly state, in holding that a railroad was not liable for failing to render aid to a trespasser
whom its train had run over:
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the omission or
negligent discharge of legal duties only which come within the sphere of judicial
cognizance. . . - The nioral law would obligate an attempt to rescue a person in a perilous IX)-
sition—as a drowning child-bttt the law of the land does not require it.
Union Pacific v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282. (Kan. 1903)
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ery by American courts. No-duty rules(D, harsh defenses~,and a
wide range of immunities~conspired to deprive injured persons of
(I) Illustratively, possessors of land ordinarily had no duty to protect trespassers on
their property from foreseeable harm, no matter how easily they might do so. See Restate-
ment, Second, of Torts 333 (1965). Likewise, public entities, such as police and fire de-
partments had no duty to protect individual citizens from harm caused by negligent failure to
perform official duties, such as failure to respond to a crisis. See Riss v. City of New York,
293 N. Y. S. 2d 897. (N. Y. 1968) (city was not liable where the police did nothing
after learning that a woman was threatened with serious physical harm-a threat which was
later carried out)
~ For example, under the classic rule of contributory negligence any carelessness on
the Part of the plaintiff was a total bar to an action based on negligence. Assumption of the
risk-meaning voluntary confrontation of a known danger-was a total bar to actions based on
recklessness, negligence, and strict liability. The fellow-servant rule held that notwithstand-
ing the usual rules under which an employee is ordinarily held liable for the torts of an em-
ployee occurring within the scope of employment, an employer was not liable for harm to an
employee which resulted from the conduct of a fellow worker. The late William L. Presser,
once the leading scholar on American tort law, described contributory negligence, assump-
tion of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule as the “three wicked sisters of the common
law.” W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on Torts 573. (5th ed. 1984)
© See At the beginning of the twentieth century:
[SI overeign immunity precluded suits against the government; spousal immunity for-
bade claims between spouses; parental immunity prevented suits by children against parents;
and charitable immunity foreclosed actions against charities. For varying reasons, these
kinds of litigation were viewed as detrimental to the common good.
Since around 1940, there has been a marked trend toward abrogating immunities in
whole or in part, on the theory that, except in extraordinary circumstances, persons should
be held accountable for the harm they tortiously cause.
Vincent R. Johnson and Alan Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 27. (2d ed.
1999)
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most opportunities to secure éompensation. The prevailing rules pro-
tected the interests of business, the process of industrialization, and
the pursuit of commercial progress by denying relief to the unfortu-
nate individuals harmed by dangerous machines, defective products,
and unssfe practices.
over the ~our~e of the twentieth century, the legal landscape of
American tort law was thoroughly transformed. Slowly but inex-
orably, virtually every feature of the American tort system was cx-
anuned and reshaped. No-duty rules were eviscerated with cxcep-
tionsED arid sometimes jettisoned entirely. ~ Defenses which OflCC tO-
tally barred recovery were modified in accordance with comparative
princil)les so that in a wide range of cases at least partial recovery is
permitted, even if the plaintiff has engaged in some form of miscon—
duct. © Immunities excusing certain classes of persons and institu-
tions from the obligation to exercise care have been widely
ED For example, with regard id) the no—duty-to—rescue rule, “courts have ita-rcased
the instances in which affirniative duties are imposed not by direct rejection of the dontnioIi
law mile, but by expanding the list of special relationships which will justify depart tire hot n
that rule. “ Soldano v. Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptn.310, 313. (Ct. App. 1983)
© See e. g. , Rowland v. Christian, 443 P. 2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (abrogatitig the
limited—duty categories applicable to premises liability litigation and substituting a ditty of
reasonable care under the circumstances); I’arasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. , 551
P. 2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (making psychotherapists liable for unreasonable failure to protect
others frotit foreseeal,le harm caused by patients); Kelly v. Gwintnell, 476 A. 2d 1219.
(N. j . 1984) ( holding that a social host who serves ~tlcoIiolto a visibly intoxicittedl guest
may be held liable to persons hanned by the guest’ s drunk dirtyIng upon loiving the pnimises)
© See e. g. , Hilen v. 1-lays, 673 S. W. 2d 713. (Ky. 1984) (adopting pure
contparative negligence under which negligence on the Part of the plaintiff will not bar recov-
ery, but merely reduce the damages awarded in a negligence case in pto~x)rtion to the pl~titt-
tiff’ s contributory negligence)
1
241
abrogated, in whole or in part. ~DToday, at the beginning of the
21st century, the genera! rule in American tort law is that all per-
sons are obliged to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm
to others. ~ctrina! departures from this basic principle are viewed
with considerable skepticism.
In addition to the widespread availability of a cause of action for
negligence (failure to exercise care), in a few narrow but important
areas-notably cases involving harm caused by defective products-
strict liability is imposed. © Thus, if a defective product harms a
consumer, the seller is held liable, regardless of why the product
was defective. © There is no need to prove that the seller was care-
less. ED All that the plaintiff must show is that the product was defec-
tive (for whatever reason) and that the defect caused harm to the
plaintiff. This means, for all practical purposes, that every product
sold in America today comes with insurance against harm caused
by defects-namely, the right to recover for resulting injuries under
principles of strict liability, if not under ordinary negligence stand-
ards.
ED See ttote 6 supra.
© See generally Restatement, ~I’hird, of Torts: Products Liability. (1998)
© Although a new Restatement of tile law on products liability was recently adopted
by the American Law Institute (see note 11 supra) , the law in most states is based on its
predecessor. See Restatement, Second, of Torts [II 402A. (1965) (stating that “( )tte who
sells arty I)roduct in a defective condition ... is subject to liability . . . [even thottgh lie]
“has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product”)
(4) See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. , 447 A. 2d 539, 546. (N. J.
1982) “in strict liability cases, culpability is irrelevant trict liability focuses on the
imsloct , not the fault of the manufacturer”
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11 Deterring Losses
The rules of tort law have deterrent force. Properly framed and
applied, they minimize the likelihood of accidents by forcing persons
who elect to undertake risky forms of conduct to internalize many of
the costs of the injuries such conduct causes. As a result, persons are
both discouraged from engaging in unnecessary injury-producing ac-
tivities and encouraged to take safety precautions, if such activities,
despite their risks, are nevertheless pursued. ED
By way of deterrence, the expansion of tort liability in America
during the twentieth century has had a tremendous impact on what
persons and institutions do. Although some argue that the threat of
liability has chilled inventiveness and deprived Americans (and the
world) of valuable products©, the shelves of American stores are far
from bare. Indeed, Americans, like persons in many other
countries, choose from a wider range of products than ever before.
More imlx)rtantly, the products that are sold in the United States
are for the most part safe, in large measure because the fear of liabil-
ED See Vincent R. Johnson and Alan Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 622 23.
(2d ed. 1999) (discussing how negligence andstrict liability affect activity levels and safety
precautions)
© See Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 5 7
(1988) (criticizing the reformulation of American tort law which began at mid-century with
the efforts of academics and judges and ultimately “changed the common law as profoundly
as it had ever been changed before”), reviewed in Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress
and tile Free Market front the Specter of Tort Liability, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1026,
1045. (1989)
ity creates an incentive for safety. As a result, American tort law
has contributed significantly to a rather remarkable state of affairs.
Today in America, products are made and activities are conducted in
a way that greatly minimizes the risk of accidental harm. At the
same time, persons who nevertheless suffer injury have a fair chance
of obtaining compensation through the legal system so that they may
put their lives back together and move on, as best possible.
1111. Financing Legal Services
A cornerstone of the American tort system is the contingent fee
contract. This arrangement for financing legal services enables any-
one who is seriously injured and has a plausibly meritorious claim to
obtain a lawyer-often a very good lawyer-even if that person has no
money to pay for representation.
A contingent fee contract gives a lawyer a financial interest in
the client’ s case that is dependent upon its success. If the lawyer
wins the case and recovers money for the client, the lawyer gets to
keep a percentage of the recovery-often something on the order of 30
to 35%, depending on the terms of the contract. ED In contrast, if
ED See Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law . . . What Might Happen if Contin-
gent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 321 , 321. ( l998) ( “the archetypal
American contingent legal fee is a thirty-th~eepercent commission that a plaintiff’ s lawyer
collects from the proceeds of the claims she handles. Sometimes the percentage is higher or
lowem; often it varies depending on the stitge at which recovery is obtained (e. g. , thirty-
three percent of a set tlernent before the l)re—tnal conference, forty percent of a judgment or
a set t lenwn t aftci- the pre— trial conferettce) ‘‘
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the case is unsuccessful and the client recovers nothing, the lawyer
receives flO payment for the services rendered. Thus, if the client
wins, the lawyer wins; if the client loses, the lawyer loses. Need-
less to say, a lawyer whose fee is contingent on success has an incen-
tive to work hard, for if the client does not prevail, the lawyer is de-
nied compensation for the work performed.
The contingent fee arrangement provides not only a device for
financing legal services, but a mechanism for screening the merits of
potential claims. A lawyer ordinarily will be unwilling to accept a
contingent fee for working on a case that lacks merit. Only suits
that have a reasonable basis in law and in fact are likely to be under-
taken on such terms. Consequently, contingent fees help to ensure
both that meritorious cases reach the courts and that legally or factu-
ally frivolous claims do not.
Although it is possible, and sometimes desirableED, for a lawyer
and client to agree to a different form of fee arrangement, virtually
all plaintiffs in American tort litigation are represented on a contin-
gent fee basis. © In contrast, the defendants in tort actions typically
~Jaytheir lawyers by the hour for the services they perform. Hourly
ED Cf. Berry Meiem and Richardl A. ()ppel Jr. , States’ Rig Sttits Agaitist Industry
Bring Rattle on Contingency Fees, N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al, col. 6. (dis-
cussitig controversy over whether contingent fees itt-C itppropriate in cases where outside
lawyems represent cities and states in suits against the makers of products such as cigarettes,
guns, and lead paint, which may poxluce enormous set tlenients and conseqitently very large
contingent fees, sometimes in the billions of dollars)
(~) See Gross, supra [tote 16, at 321.
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billing, like contingent fees, creates an incentive for thoroughness in
the preparation of a case. The more hours worked, the greater the
fee earned by the lawyer. So long as the defendant (or the
defendant’ s insurance company) is willing to pay the bill, there is
little reason for a lawyer to forego ~teps which reasonably should be
undertaken for the purpose of mounting a robust defense,
Consequently, as presently structured, the financing of attor-
neys’ fees in the American tort system tends to ensure that the
claims decided in litigation are throughly investigated, well
prepared, and vigorously asserted. ED That, of course, is appropriate
in the American adversarial system of justice, which depends for its
success on the clash of competing interests as a vehicle for learning
the truth about the facts and fairly resolving claims. ©
1V. Turning Back the Clock
Many IJersons are unhappy with the present state of the Amen-
ED Of cottrse, reality sometimes falls short of these goals. It is possible, for example,
for a l)ersoltal itijury attorney working on a contingent fee basis to generate a high income
based on sheer volunte of clients, rather than diligence and hard work in particular cases.
~l’hisproblem has been exasperated by the adlvent of lawyer advertising, which since 1977
b05 been cotistitutional. See Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U. S. 350. (1977) (holding
that advertising of the cost and availability of routine legal services is protected by the First
Atnendintent to the United States (‘onstittition)
© See William Ilitrnham, Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United
States 78—83. (2d. ed. 1999) (discussing the characteristics and rationale of the adversary
system)
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can tort system. A regime which makes it possible for the injured to
have their day in court threatens the status quo, the established way
of doing business. If some persons have a fair shot of prevailing on a
tort claim, then others stand to lose. The persons with the most to
lose are often those whose affairs affect, and potentially cause harm
to, the greatest number of persons. Not surprisingly, businesses and
other institutions often feel threatened by contemporary American
tort law.
Over the last twenty or so years, potential tort defendants have
sought, in a variety of ways, to undo the twentieth century plain-
tiffs’ revolution in tort law. These efforts to “re-form” the Ameri-
can law of torts have met with varying degrees of success. At a min-
imum, it is fair to say that the reform efforts have been so frequent
and so aggressive that it is plausible that they might ultimately suc-
ceed to a large measure in “turning back the clock” to a time when
American tort plaintiffs were often denied adequate compensation
for injuries and when tort law did little to create incentives for
safety.
1 Swaying the Attitudes of Jurors
In the American tort system, disputed questions of fact are dIC-
cided by laypensons, rather than by judges or other professionals. (D
These laypersons are gathered from the community through a largely
ED See William Burnham, Introduction to the Law and Legal System 0f the United
States 83 — 88. (2d ed. 1999) (discussing American juries and contrasting Americart jtttors
with Eumopeati “Comttinental lay judges ... [who] are . . . generally screenedl for service
rather than being randomly selected from the jxpulatioti at large”)
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random processED to hear the evidence in a case. After the case is
over, these persons return to their jobs, and most are unlikely to
serve on a jury ever again. ©
As members of a jury, a group normally consisting of twelve
persons, lay jurors decide disputed questions of fact. If there is con~
flicting evidence, and reasonable minds can differ as to who should
be believed, it is up to the jury to decide what in fact occurred. For
example, if there is evidence tending both ways, the jury will deter-
mine whether the defendant’ s car was in the wrong lane, or was
traveling too fast, at the time the auto accident occurred.
In tort cases, juries also decide questions relating to the stan-
dard of care. © For example, the law of negligence states that a per-
son must exercise reasonable care, but it is normally up to the jury to
decide whether the defendant, at the time of the accident, acted as a
ED In somestates, potential jurors are drawn from the list of persons licensed to drive
motor vehicles. On a given day, hundreds of these persons, whose names are chosen ran-
dontly, are called to the courthouse for jury service. A panel with perhaps as many as forty
or fifty potential jurors ~n it will be assigned td) one of the courts. The attorneys in the case
are allowed to briefly question the potential jurors by asking relevant questions, for exantple,
who the jurors work for or whether they are related to the any of the parties. ~I’heattorneys
are then perniiued to request that persons be excluded from the jury in cases of “good cause”
(such as ownership of an equity interest in an entity that is party to the litigation) and, in a
limited number of instances, without stated reasons. After ruling on sitch challenges, a
jury, normally consisting of twelve persons, is impaneled from those who are not excused
from service. The persons not seated on the jury may be either assigned to another court as
potential jurors in a different case or allowed to go home.
© Jury service is relatively rare. I have served on one jury. Neither my wife, my
parents, or my tWd) brothers have ever served on a jury.
© See Restatement, Second, of l’orts 285 Cmt. g. (1965) (discussing the function
of a jury in a tort case)
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reasonable person would have acted in the same or similar circurn-
stances. Naturally, there is a good deal of discretion in the decision-
making process. Realistically, jurors are influenced by not only the
evidence adduced in court, but by their predispositions concerning
whether injured persons deserve compensation and whether the legal
system operates fairly. In this respect, the jurors’ beliefs about the
legitimacy of the litigation process may color the jury’ s determina-
tions about what the facts were and about whether legal standards
were violated.
Recognizing that juries play a key role in the functioning of the
American tort system, tort reformers aligned with the insurance de-
fense bar have waged a fierce battle in recent years for the hearts and
minds of potential jurors. The most visible evidence of this ongoing
public relations campaign are the billboard “wars” that have raged a-
long the highways in some of America’ s largest cities. In some
metropolitan areas, it is virtually impossible for potential jurors to
reach the courthouse for jury duty without driving past one or more
huge signs intended to sway their attitudes about lawsuits. They of-
ten see these larger-than-life advertisements once or more a day, for
months at a time.
One billboard advertisement that was ubiquitous in major Texas
cities during the 1990s read: “Lawsuit Abuse: We All Pay, We All
Lose!” Sponsored by a defense-oriented group styling itself as “Citi-
zens Against Lawsuit Abuse,” the advertisements sought to plant in
the minds of potential jurors the idea that many lawsuits are
frivolous and that when money is paid out for fraudulent or trivial
tort claims, “we all pay, we all lose.” The plaintiffs’ bar has been
slow to respond to such defense-oriented advertisements, and their
efforts have been less than successful. ED It is easier to attack the
American tort system with the language of pithy sound-bites, than
to defend the system’ s complexities with similar brevity.
It is difficult to say what effect high-profile public relations
campaigns have had on the ability of plaintiffs with meritorious
claims to collect for their injuries. The anecdotal evidence suggests
that such advertising has been a significant factor in reducing the
size, frequency, and adequacy of damages awards in tort cases. ~ In
a suit litigated during the mid-1990s in San Antonio, Texas, the na-
tion’ s eighth largest city, fifty prospective jurors were asked
whether they had seen highway billboards complaining about lawsuit
abuse. Forty-nine of the fifty persons reported that they had. © At
the very least, lawsuit-abuse advertising has succeeded in capturing
the attention of potential jurors. one consequence of the public rela-
ED In Houston, one billboard ad sponsored by the plaintiffs’ bar read, “Prisons are
for Common Criminals, Punitive i)amages are for Corporate Criminals.” Presumably, the
idea was to taint corporate wrongdoing with an air of criminality and to persuade potential
jurors that in tort cases awards of punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages,
areoften appropriate. Another billboard ad it-i Corpus Christi, ~I’exas,asked bluntly: “Is
Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Racist?” The ad apparently sought to capitalize on the idea
that denial of tort compensation can be a form of discrimination against minorities.
© Cf. Milo Geyelin, Far Fewer Plaintiffs Are Winning Product-Liability 1.awsuits
Now, Wall St. J. , July 12, 1994, at B9, available in Westlaw at 1994 WL-WSJ 334983.
(noting that business groups maintain that damage awards are still too high, but agree there
has been a noticeable pro-defense shift in juror attitudes)
© I was one of the 50 potential jurors called in that case and my reaction was the per-
son who had not seen the lawsuit abuse advertising was so unobservant that I would not
want him on my jury if I were a litigant.
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tions battles and other initiatives relating tothe tort system is that
the news media frequently reports on such issues. The phrase “tort
reform” so frequently appears in public media that persons, who just
a few years ago had no idea what a “tort” was, now willingly ex-
press opinions on alleged lawsuit abuse and the necessity of reform-
ing tort law. ED
The recent public relations campaigns to influence the attitudes
of American jurors are just one indication of the efforts that are be-
ing made in some quarters to “turn back the clock” to a time when
tort law was more generous to potential defendants. Because large-
scale public relation activities are expensive, these campaigns also
suggest the tremendous stakes that underlie the battle over tort re-
form.
2. Tort-Reform Legislation
Tort law in the United States was once almost exclusively the
province of the courts. © The law was made, applied, and revised
primarily by judges incidental to the process of ruling on the disputes
that came before them. Because of the American tradition of an in-
ED Cf. Editorial, Review & Outlook: ~I~heLawyers’ Party, Wall. St. J. , Oct. 5,
1999, at A26, available in Westlaw, 1999 WL-WSJ 24916515:
Ina collection of short essays, “250 Ways to Make America Better,’ put d)ut by
George magazine, apolitical figures Martina Navratilova and Rapper Ice 1’ dedicate theirs to
tort reform. Ms. Navratilova: “i~heloser of a lawsuit should pay the legal fees. These
days, as soon as a person feels slighted or injured (physically or emotionally), they look for
someone to sue. - . . The hope is not to win, 1)ut for the quick $50, 000— because it’ s
cheaper to settle than to fight.
© See Percy H. Winfield, The Foundations of Liability in Tort, 27 Colum. L.
Rev. I, 4—S. (1927) (discussing Anglo-American tort jur~isprudence)
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dependent judiciary, ED this meant that the legislative and executive
branches of government played only a minor role in shaping tort
rules and remedies
However, the twentieth century in America saw the rise of
statutory law making. ® So effective have been legislative assertions
of law-giving powers that today most Americans think of legislatures
as the primary, if not the exclusive, source of legal rules. Persons
with a short-term view of Anglo-American history decry law making
by the courts as unwarranted judicial activism, although that process
has been underway for almost a thousand years, “since not long after
William defeated Harold at the Battle of Hastings in 1066. “© While
tort law, in many respects, is still a “common-law” field (meaning
that judges continue to make and revise the law), it is equally true
that over the last hundred years American legislatures have assumed
an increasingly greater role in defining the law of torts.
ED The Chief Justice of the United States, William H. Rehnquist, has argued that an
independent judiciary is the unique American contribution to the theory and practice of gov-
ernment. See Address by Chief Justice William 1-I. Rehnquist, Northern Illinois University
School of Law, DeKaIb, Illinois 2 (Oct. 20, 1988). Regarding the importance of judicial
independence, see also Vincent Robert Johnson, The French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and Citizens of 1789, The Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris,
13 Boston CoIl. Int’ I and Comp. L. Rev. 1, 14— 24. (1990) (discussing the absence of
an independent judiciary to protect individual rights during the French revolution)
© See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1 (1982)
“statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of law”); Ellen Ash
Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 995, 1008.
(1982) (discussing the public’ a expectation that problems will be solved legislatively)
© Vincent R. Johnson and Alan Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 3. (2d ed.
1999)
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Pnionditions to litigation. ED However, other tort reform legislation has gone
much further and addn~p~jissues of a substantive vaiiety, For example,
sore statutes exempt certain classes of penons and institutiona fiom liability
for ordinazy negligence. ©
In many cases, tort reform has been justified on the giound that exist-
ing rules led to a “ciisis” in a p~rticula~field of endeavor by impexing liabili-
ty so maclily and extensively that using ~n~tsfuom lawsths threaten~Jto
make pirxjuc~or services in the field unavailable Siolan~are divided as to
whether these “crises” have been real or rerely perceived. The dubious
have ai~edthat tort reform has been the pn~ductrut so much of crisis
managerent by legislators, but of legislative deference to well-funded speeial
interest gioupa that have the ability to influence the legislative electonjl pm-
c~isthtough campaign contuibutio~s.
Whatever the cause of legislative tort reform, it is clear that many
wurts resist statutoiy encmac}~y~ntsinto what was once largely the domain
(4~±~ ~.t©) Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a ‘Iôrt Claim?: An Interpxvtation of
l~rtReform, 51 ~1. L. Rev. 172, ‘90—191(1992) At lo~t,“25jurirdictit~~havernw~t
i~zr~form of legislation governing the eallatezol sowte nile.” ld. at 191 n. 51.
ED For example, a nncenl statute in ièxas restricts the assignability of malpmctice claims, ~-
In~esa $ 500, 0(X) cap on x xtun~nicdamages, changes the standard of pmaf to “ckar and ecri-
vincing” evidence, and requiresplaintiffs to thher au1zi~tan expert report within 90 days of filing suit
or peat a $ 5000 bend under penalty of sanctions against the plaintiff. 7èx. Rev. Civ. Stat. 11.
02, 13. 01, and 13. 02. (1995)
© For example, Recreational Use Statutes have been passed in many jurisdictions. ~J}teCali-
fornia law ptovides that
An owner of... real properly ... owes no duty of care to keep the Prcoiv.~safe (dir entry or
use by others for any recniational purlxae or to give any warning of hazardous eonditict~.s, uses of,
structures, or activities on such preniises to pelzons €ntering fdir such pur~zae,except [under the lim-
ited tema of the statute]. Calif. Civ. Gxle 846 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
In view of the growing statutonfication of An~iicantort law, one
‘~uldexpeet that tk~eseeking to make the law of torts nui~defense-ori-
ented would plead their cai~ before the legislatuma. That is precisely what
has occum~d.Legislative piopet~alsrelating to “tort reform” are row ubiqui-
tous. During the past quarter centuly, wave alter wave of reform legislation
has been debated by legislators, and many bills have been enacted. These
reform statutes have often addi~tsedpmcedur~tland ierrthal issues in the
law of torts~ For example, statutes have “capped” or limited awanis of cer-
tain types of damagesED, shortened or otherwise made rmre stringent
statutes of limitations©, nudified the collateral ~~ourQerule ©, or imposed
ED See Fein v. Pennanmte Medical Group, 695 P. 2d 665 (Cal. 1995) (uphelding a
$ 250,0(X) cap on tu~i-eixmnicdamages in a medical malpractice case); Gi-in. (km Stat. Ann.
52— 240b. (1993) (limding punitive damages to twice the untpcnsatory award in a pruleets liability
action)
© See Goktsmith v. Fbwnarlia, Inc., 491 N. E. 2d 1097. (N. Y. 1986) (discussing a
statute, enacted in res~xtnseto xxnplaints about liege nindical malpntctice verdicts, which lxtrredr~xne
malpractice claims before they even amse, as where a &xtor s negligence cait~no harm to the
plaintiff for several years)
© I have written elsewhere that:
The wllrte al-souree rule holds that a plaintiff’ s recovery ftmi the defendant shall not be di-
niinish€rI because the plaintiff has received benefits covering use aspect of damages fiun a
other than the defendant or one acting on the defendant a behalf (or hun a jolt-it tortfeasor or one
Who bdie~himself to be a joint td)rlfoeor). ~1hus, the fact that the plaintiff has Ixan unpertsated
by personal medical insurance, has been taken care of free of charge by a veterans’ kapital, or has
tseeived grntutt(xLs ntasing services fiun aspouse or neighbor is not taken into account. The reason is
that such arnxtnts are normally the result of the plaintiff’ a own haiti wark or fomsight, or at keist
are a gift to the plaintiff, rather than to the defendant.
Vincent R. Johnrrn, Mastering Thrts 58. (2d ed. 1999)
Iti the 1970s several jurisdictions abolished ... [thewllatenl source rule] by statute in medical
malpractice cases; in the 1980s a latger number alxilisherl it (again by statute) in all tort clairris. In
these jurisdictions, IJn~stand pmspective insurance benefits paid or payable to theplaintiff are offset a-
gainat the plaintiff s recovery.
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of the judiciaty. Tort reform statutes are always challenged in the courts.
While many laws have survived judicial review, numerous others have been
declared invalid. Courts frerjuently rely upon their constitutional powers to
overrule tort reform legislation. Reflecting on tort law during the closing
years of the twentieth century, scholars have remarked that” En] ever be-
fore have state constitutional provisions been used on ~ grand a scale to
overturn state legislative policy decisions. “ED
There is ru end in sight to legislative tort reform, ror to the challeng-
ing of such laws on constitutional grounds. The continuing struggle over
whether legistatums will have the last word in defining the law of torts is
one nDIe indicia of the deep struggle currently being waged over the terms
and availability of accident compensation for tort victims in Ani~rica.
3. Attacks on the Ci~ntingentFee System
No reform pmpe€als have &o threatened the viability of the current tort
system as recent efforts to curtail the use of contingent fees. © Proponents
ED Victor E. &hwartz, Mark A. llehrens, and Mark I). ijiylor, Win Should Make Ameri-
ca’ sTort Law: Courtsor Legislatures?, at2IS. (Wash. Legal Found. 1997)( “scholarshave
hailed this dewlolxnent as erie of the nut impurtant ... eccurlmces in the deveotiimiit of tort law
in the past fifty years”). The authors counted at least sixty state court j~k~isduring tu~hlya
decade which used state constitutional p~ovistonsto nullify state legislative tort reform. Id.
© A ptqmal endorsed by the Marthattan Institute, a conservative think tank, wnuld bar per-
anal injury lawyem fruin charging their standard contingent fee on the purticn of any ultimate rernv-
eiy which the defendant had offered in settlenxait ptuçxaals before or shortly after the lawyer was re-
tained. Lester Brickman, Michael I-bmwitz & Jeffrey 0’ Ccunell, Rethinking Ccnting~yFer~
(Manhattan Inst. Mxiogra~thSeries No. 1, 1994); N’~chadRartwitz, Making Ethics Rnd, Mak-
ing Ethics Work: A Ptoixeal for Qiitingency Fee Reform, 44 Envry L. J. 173 (1995); Jeffrey
0’ Connell, Early Offers as Contingent Fee Reform, 47 t~PaulL. Rev. 413, 418 19 (1998).
The Manhattan Institote pnipusal calls for:
legislation or judicial rules that rer~uireplaintiff’ s petvertal injury lawyers to~ieitearly settle-
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of such plans have rightly ruted that contingent fee contracts ~umetirnespro-
duce exorbitant fees, particularly in class action litigation and cases involving
catastrophic penonal injuries. Yet aixilishing or substantially limiting the use
of contingent fees could surely mean that many individuals would be denied
redress through the court system. ED Few per~nsof ordinary means-let alone
the ixor-have the wherewithal to pay attorneys fees calculated on an hourly
basis. The charge for a lawyer’ s time typically ranges between $ 100 to
(4~_L~T£i©) nnat offers before they wauld be eligible to charge their standard contingent feet a-
gain.st any part of the ultimate rnnvety. Under this piqxnial, early offers wauld not serve merely as
useful information for the client in n~Dtiatinga contingent fee. Rather, arniunts offered as settle-
ments before the lawyer is retainer], or after retention but within sixty days of the lawyer’ s manda-
tory solicitation, ~uld be deemed not to be at risk, and thus not subject to the standard fee, even
when the offers are r~ectedand withdrawn.
Ths scheme v,uild impeae a subatantial administrative burden on the ir~u1yvictim’ a lawyer,
because early offer solicitations must include “the material facts relevant to the claim,” such as the In-
sis for claiming that the solicited party is resixiisible for the client’ a injuty. Similarly, to ensure that
claimants and their lawyers can nirtningfully evaluate settlement offers, solicited tnt-ties wIn chcxae to
make early offers must include any inn-privileged materiaLs relevant to the injury which they “relied
on” in developing their offers....
Ted Schneyer, Legal-Pnxass Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Con-
tracts, 47 [Afaul L. Rev. 371, 408 —09. (1998)
A version of the Manhattan Institute ptqxaal appeared as Ptqxaition 202 on the (Talifomia hal-
kt in March 1996, but was defeated. See G. Paseal Zachary, California’ a ftfeat of Legal, Insur-
ance Overhaul Raises Questicits Alnut Thrt Reform Nationwide, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1996, at
A16, available in Wettlaw at 1996 WL.WSJ 3096488 (discussing defeat of kaer pays pto~xnalrelat-
ing to securities fraud). Someaspects of the prqxaal were incorporated into the Comrtnn Sense Pox]-
net Liability Reform Act that President Clinton vetoed on May 2, 1996. See Angel Wennihan, Let’
s Put the Contingency Back in the Contingent Fee, 49 S. M. U. L Rev. 1639, 1670 — 72.
(1996)
ED See Gttas, supra note 16, at 345, predicting that if contingent fees were rtlnlished:
[T] here vaiuld be a great decrease in the number of damage claims brought it-i court or in any
forum. In addition to the effects that wouki have on the txtential claimants and defendants, this do-
crease in litigation would have major repercussions for the legal Ptofmaion and the legal system as a
whae.
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$ 300 per hour. In the akience of contingent fees, few attorneys display
any willingness to repla~the txxnrmn practice of hourly billing with ~
mire affordable form of fee calculation.
At the n-oment, direct attacks on the contingent fee system have sub-
sided. After the issue received much attention in the late 1980s and early
199Os, the pawerki! American Bar As~thation,in 1994, weighed in on the
subject by issuing a widely muted ethks opinion. (I) The ABA twk the ~i-
tion that contingent fees are ethically permissible, even in cases where the
client could afford to pay under sure other fee arnuigernent.
What has rut suhided are equally threatening pmpc~alsto alter the
“American nile” on attorneys fees, pursuant to which each side bears its
own cx~tsof legal representation. © Plans are frequently put forth to discard
the American approach in favor of the “English rule, “© the “lc*ter pays”
principle ® Under that approach, the laser in litigation mnu~st pay the
ED See AI1’\ Cctnmn. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal C~. 94 — 389.
(1994) (refusing to declare unethical the ecznnui practice annng petnenal injury lawyers c)f charging
stat-wires] oxitingent fera~rather than ~ng car~hfee on a custernizeci estimate of the this of gaining a
renvety, the likely anntuit of the rerxtvety, and the effort the case is likely to require)
© Edward F. Sherman, From “liner Pays” to Madifled Offer of Judgernerit Rules: Renii-
ailing Inc tivestoSett1ewiihAccv~ettoJustice,76~1èxasL. Rev. 1863, 1863. (1998) ( “The’
Anietican rule’ that parties will bear the met of their own attorneys’ feesin litigation, whether or not
they win or kne, has a long pedigree going back to the etdiest clays ofour republic”)
(1) See Skiemian, supra note 42, at 1863. (noting that the “English nile” is followed in Great
Britain and n~nrEumprxui mtkxis)
ED See ‘lirnias I). Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Cctnpensation?: The Contract with Anierica,
liner-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a (lie-Way Alternative, 37 Washburn L. J. 317 (1998)
(dbeutáig fee-shifting pn~xnals);Gregoty E. Mitggs and Michael 1). Weiss, Pujgre~onAttorneys
Fea~:Expanding the liner-Pays Rule in Texas, 30 l-h~.L. Rev. 1915, 1920. (1994) (noting
that in the early l990s, Former President Bush’ a Council en Ccxnpetitivcneet ptutntcsi a general
kner-pays rule for the federal courts)
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winner’ s attorneys f~. Needless to say, if nTxst penons canmut afford to
pay the f~sof their own lawyer, except on a contingent basis, those same
pei~ns,when unsuccessful in litigation, can hardly afford to pay the fees
charged by their op~x)nent’ s attorney. The adoption of a lc~r-paysrule
would have a t n~ncj~n~impact on the operation of the tort system. R’rther
than risk incurring liability for the fees of one’ s opjonent, many per~ns
would simply forego bringing claims, at least in the large range of cases in
which the issue of liability is lc~than perfectly clear. ED
Laser-pays piope~aJscontinue to be a comnun element in tort reform
legislation. © S~far these pmjx~taJs have been essentially unsuccessful.
1-bwever, with the continuing hew and cry against frivolous litigation and
lawsuit abuse, the laser-pays idea is unlikely to go away. © These projx~taLs,
and others relating to contingent fees, are additional examples of the on-go-
ing debate over how readily relief through the courts should be available to
tort victims.
4. Fdera1jzatj~j~of ~rt Law
In the American federal system, tort law is generally a creature of the
state, rather than the national, government. States are free to define the
terms under which individuals will be compensated for penonal injury or
property damage. Typically, state ]x)wer in such matters is only lightly con-
ED See Francis J. Carney, “liner Pays” -Justice for the Pcnrest and the Richest, Others
Need ~t Apply, 8-May Utah B. J. 18. (1995) (discussing the English Rulefnni the perspective
of an A.tnetican ~nian win litigated a death claim in England)
© See Sherman, .supra note 42, at 1866 67. (discussing repeated Coogressicna] aitsiders-
tim of relater] pmpnals)
(~) See generally Walter OL’wji arid E)ivid Bernstein, Lix~-Pays:Where Next?, 55 Md. L.
Rev. 1161, 1186. (1996) (predicting that “legislative experirrwnrs with Leer-pays will continue to
spnng up)
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strained by the federal ConstitutionED or by preemption under federal law. ©
Becaus~states c.k) rot always act in uni~onin addr~ssingtocial problems, a
penons’ s rights under tort law often differ from one state to the next.
One consequence of America’ s decentralized approach to the law of
accident compensation is that states have nxxn for experimentation with ex-
panded forms of liability. Such innovation affects rot only the state in ques-
tion, but other jurisdictions as well. As one state experiments, others can
watch and evaluate the results. The ability of states to learn from the expe-
rience of other jurisdictions contributes greatly to the overall health and vi-
tality of the American tort system. It is also something of a liberating influ-
ence.
‘The adoption of new causes of action, and the discontinuance of previ-
ous doctrinal restrictions on recovery, is often op~x~sedon the ground that
the pro~nscdchange will “open the fkudgatcs of litigation,” thereby inun-
ED In a few areas, the federal (‘on.stitution greatly constrains state tort law. For example, the
First Arotatdtneiit to the United States Constitution guarantees Ireethn of speech and fretikm of the
press. Thus, torts involving anie form of cx*iittiunicatico of idett.s face formidable First Amendment
otntacles. Sutsequent to the United States Suprcinc Court’ s decision in New York fln~sv. Sulli-
van, 376 U. 5. 254 (1964), the law of defamatiort has been entirely trattsfotmcd to comply with
the doniancis of the federal Constitution.
© Sec Vincent R. John..on, Mastering iôrts 190 (2d cxl. 1999): In recent yeats, there has
been much litigation aIx~ttwhether - - [torts] claims in specific contextsare pre-empted by federal
laws regulating thuse fields. It is not lxa~sibleto generalize atout when a claim will be pre-€mpted,
other than to say that there is no preetnptioli itnkscs the purpae of Congress to achieve that result is
clear and manifest. In each case, the analysis is highly fact specific, and the decision tunis upan a
careful reading of the language of the legislation and the legislative history behind the eriactnwnt. An
intent on thepart of Congress to pre-enipt state tort law may be explicitly stated in the statute’ a lan-
guage or implicitly contained in its structureand purlxne. The provisions of the law must heconstrued
in light of a presumption against the pretirtption of state palice-[ower regulations.
See alan Ci~nlkirev. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U. S. 504. (1992)
dating the courts with a multitude of suits tco great to handle and im~xxsing
on defendants crushing liability. There is plausible merit to these arguments
in view of the fact that the judiciary is the least well-funded branch of
American government. The reources available for staffing, courtrtonis, and
the like are limited. Private reources-whether devoted to accident wrnpen-
sation or other goals-are likewise finite.
However, the history of American tort law during the twentieth cen-
tury has shown that “flcxxjgates” arguments and “crushing burden” argu-
ments are often exaggerated. In this respect, the decentralized nature of the
tort law has spurred change by debunking exaggeration. It is difficult to ac-
cept the contention that the courts or particular lines of endeavor will be
pressed beyond the breaking paint by a proixxted change in the law if one
can lcok to the experience of other states where that change has occurred
and not produced the predicted calamity.. That is precisely what many
American courtsdid during the revolution in American tort law that expand-
cii tort liability during the twentieth century. ED As individual states experi-
ED Cf. l~ssy.Cityof New York, 293 N. Y. S. 2d897(N. Y. 1968). In aspjing that
the public-duty rule, which exempts a tolice department from liability based on failure to respe~ndto
an emergency call, should be ahelished, Jttclge Keeting wrote:
~Iliefonm~tjustification repeatedly urger] for the existing rule is the claim that the State and
the municipalities will be ex~xs€dto limitless liability.
‘lire fear of financial disaster is a myth. The same amgumnent was made a generation ago in op~-
sition to pmolxrcals that the State waive its defense of “anvereign immunity.” The prophecy proved
false then, and it would now... No municipality has gone bankrupt because it has had to reslx)nd in
damages when a tidicernan causes injury through carelusslydriving a plice car or in the thousands of
other situatioris where ... the State and its subdivisions have been held liable for the tot-tious conduct
of their employees.
Id. at 901.
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rented with the abrtgation of traditional inm~unitiesand the relaxation of
no-duty rules, other states, seeing that the results were not catastrophic,
followed suit.
Of course, the decentralization of American tort law ak has its x~its,
particularly with respect to mass-marketed products. Ifa defective product is
suld and used in fifty states, lawsuits may be brought in any of tk*e juris-
dictions A manufacturer seeking to protect itself full from liability mast
comply with the terms of. tort law in every state where the product is sold.
As a practical matter, this often means that a manufacturer will find itself
cxnipelkil to adhere to the n~tdemanding standards, th~ im~x~edby the
nrr~tplaintiff-friendly of the many states.
Not surprisingly, thuse who feel aggrieved by the current state of
American tort law have ~oughtrelief from the federal government, arguing
that federal uniformity of the law, at least in ~orneareas, will improve effi-
ciency, reduce cxx~ts,and produce greater consistency in results. Tort reform
pio~alsbefore Congress are now comnnnplàce. The fiercest battles have
related to attempts to pass of a prq~eseduniform law on products liability
that would replace the existing patchwork of laws and decisions in the fifty
states. ED The ennclrnent ofsuch a law would do much to further the goals of
legal simplicity and efficiency. But it would ako make it easier for the re-
foment to restrict the availability of compensation to accident victims. That
is, if products liability law were federalized,, additional reforms could be
achieved by addressing legislative ptoir€als to one federal Congress. It is un-
ED See generally Editorial: A Senate Mistrial, Wall St. j., May 8, 1995, at A14, available
in Westlrtw at 1995 WL-WSJ 8709454. (noting that proponents of legal reform had been trying to
bring a pnxlucts liability bill to the Senate flour for 15 ye-irs, without suceess)
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cbubtedly easier to focus reformefforts to limit accident ccmpensation on one
federal legislature, than on fifty legislatures at the state level.
Refomi~care tantalizingly ck~eto enacting a federal products liabili-
ty law in the l990s, but a Presidential veto thwarted that effort. ~) In other
areas, succ~sin federalizing tort law has been achieved only at the margins.
Congreis has passed five minor pieces of federal tort reform legislation that
have become law: the National (lildhxxl Vaccine Injury Act of 1986©,
the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994©, the Volunteer Protection
Act of 1997®, I3iomateijals Access Assurance Act of 1998©, and the Year
2000 Information and Readiness Disclctsure Act. © The significance of these
laws lies rot ~ much in what they do as in what they syrnbalize: the pro-
priety of federal ~iutions to tort problems.
There is little iea~onto expect that tort reformers will less fn~nently
turn to Congress in the future as part of their efforts to restructure the law
of torts. Indeed, such recourse would seem to be particularly likely if, un-
like the case during the past twenty yeara, one palitical party gains control
of both houses of Congress and the Presidency. The recent federalization of
~me minor areas of tort law, and the attempts to federalize the major field
of product liability, are additional indicia of the on-going battle over
(I) See Hilary Stout, Clinton, as Expected, Vetoes Legislatkin To Cut-b Pruiuct-Liability Suit
Awards, Wall St. J., May 3, 1996, at Bli, available in Westlaw at 1996 WL-WSJ 3101559.
(disctis~iugveto)
© 42 U. S. C. [IL] 300aa4 to 33. (1986)
© 49 U. S. C. 040101. (Westlaw 1999)
ED 42 U. S. C. [114501 — 14505. (Westlaw 1999)
([i) Pub. L, 105—230, Atg. 13, 1998, 112 Stat. 1519. (to be cxxjificxj at 21 U. S. C.
A. 01601)
(iD Pub. L, 105—271, C~t.19, 1998, 112 Stat. 2386.
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how readily tort victims will be provided ainpensation through the tort
system.
5. Judicial Activism
The twentieth century plaintiff’ s revolution in American tort law was
achieved largely through judicial activism at the state level. ED It is therefore
rot surprising that reformers to seek to undo time changes by res~rtingto
the very sane agents for change, state court judges.
[uiring the last two decades of the twentieth century, many state
courts, particularly at the highest levels, tcok a decidedly conservation turn.
For example, in Tléxas, the nation’ s third largest state, the Supreme
Court, which as late as the mid-1980s had been ~lid1y pro-plaintiff, aligned
itself unabashedly with the insurance defense bar. © In the process of swing-
ing from one end of the jurisprudential spectrum to the other, the Texas
Supreme Court abolished tori causes of action©, limited the role of juries®,
and ruled in favor of defendants in a very high percentage of cases. ©
In sure states, judges on the highest court are ap~xintedon the basis
ED Fluber, supra note 15, at 5—7.
© SecThrnthy E). Fbwell, Se Long “Sweetheart” -State Farm Firo & Casualty Co. v.
Gandy Swings the l’endulurn Further to the Right as the bitest in a Line of Setbacks for Texas
Plaintiffs, 29 St. Mary’ sL. J. 47, 52—60. (1997) (di cut.sitig theTexas Supre-rie Court
s adoption of “decidedly defense-oriented stance” resulting in a “1O~aidednumber of victories for defen-
dant~’)
@) See, e. g., P~ylesv. Kerr, 855 S. W. 2d 593. (lèx. 1993) (abelishing for nn~t
practical piilxssns the ca&ae of action for negligent infliction of motional distnass)
ED 61 See Chief Justice Phil 1-laniberger, Juries Under Sege, 30 St. Mary’ s L. 3. 1.
(1998) (clirct~ngdecisicns of the Tlèxas Supreme (hni)
© S~MazyFkxx1,Ox1 ea(tnnersRrtreWma, Wall St. J., Jul. 8, 1998, at Ti,
available in Westlaw at 1998 WL-WSJ 35(X)746. (diacawing rare plaintiff victory before the Texas
Sttprenie Court)
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of merit; in others, they are elected, snetin~ on a partisan basis. (I) The
election of judges risks unnecessarily çoliticizing the adninistration of
justice, because judicial election campaigns ec~tnoney, and contributors to
such races (alnmt exclusively lawyers) often expect s3rrething in exchange
for their contributions other than mere judicial neutrality, independence,
and gtxxl government.
In many states, raising money for judicial candidates is an integral
corn~onentof plans for tort reform.© In sDne instances, huge arrounts of
money are pDured into the process, with the hope of not merely influencing
the outcome of the contest, but of shaping tort doctrine in years to cone.
These bitter partisan battles over judicial selection are one more indicator of
the current struggle over the terms of accident compensation.
6. The Future of American ~ThrtLaw
American tort law is not what it was yesterday, and not what it will
be tomorrow. Particularly in the field of torts, the law is never static. At
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the battle over the terms and
availability of accident compensation is being waged as fieiocly as at any time
ED See [~rñdR. [‘k~a,Fbw J~es Are Selected: A Suiwy of theJudicial Selectkn Pnxess
in the Unite-I States, 75 Mich. B. J. 904, 904. (1996) (“Four pt-it-nary mathxls are wed to select
judges in the Unite-I States: gubernatorial apjxintn~nt,gubernatorial apçointnient with retenticit
dection, partLsan election and ric*ipartisan decton”)
© See Wayne E. Green, Texas Businesses Play J~licialPditka-Their (~ectiveIs to Shape
The High Court, Wall St. 3., Sept. 12, 1988, available in West-law at 1988 WL-WSJ 446233:
Getting the right judges on thestate Siprtme Court has berxxne serious busintss for Texas b~-
ness. Fe-I up with kaing enurt cases that expand the rights of plaintiffs to sue and enilect high-dollar
damages, theb~nesserninunity has decided to try to eliminate the j~es who vote that way-and
replace them with judges who think as they do. Se after years of ignoring Supreme Court elections,
business grou~are weighing in with nutey, e-xbnsen~its,get-exit-the-vote campaigns and ixAitical
rr~eagesdesigned to show that the exirt is hurting theTexas etxmny with anti-bwin~decisions.
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in American history. As always, the stake are high. Fbw the briaree is
stnek will detemire many things, ind~ngwhether injured per~iiswill
be afforekal relief, whether pnxftts will be sale, whether busiur~swill be
axnpetitive, and whether entrepreneurs will be frt~to pursue new hori~oris
urebified by the specter of tort liability.
In defining the terms of tort law, each generation mast strike a be!-
ar~ethat ompurts with its notions of tocial justice. Consideration mast be
given to aznpeting ideas, steh as penmal iudependeree and irilividual ze-
spunsibility, on ci~band, and cxmrmal interdependence and axial ac-
axintability, on the other.
There are many things wrong with the Anerican tort system, and
they should of course be addreisetl-in a precise and thoughtful fashion.
I-bvvever, one should rot lore sight of the fact that in America at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century life is relatively safe from risks of accidental
harm, and that the victims of the acxidents that do occur have a reasonably
fair’ chance of thtainirig z~lr~.American tort law-as shaped the expansion
and reform of liability concepts during the past hundred years-bears a rrea-
aire of credit for this enviable situation.
